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IN THE Sill'REME CO!Tfn' OJ<' TTIESTATJ<: OF TTTAH

LOREN 1{. BROCKBANK, et al.,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
Case No. 1600CJ
-vs.JAY B" BALDWIN, JR., et al.,
DefendantsAppellants.

--------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a class action suit brought by

Plaint.itT~-RPsponclPnts

sPeking a judicial determination of the inapplicability of a residPntial
restrictive covenant to a subdivision lot intended for and spPcifically
resPrved and designated by the subdivision developer· for cnrnmr>rcial 11se.

DJSPC>SITION IN THE DJSTniCT COURT
Plaintiffs-Respondents moved for s11mmary .iuclgment.

On

April 7, 1978, oral argument was had in the Di~trirt Co~1rt nf S>.lt Lakr·
County.

The CoCJrt, after taking the matter unclc>r advi~c>rnent, grantPcl

Pia intiffs- Respondents' Motion.

RELIEF SOUGHT OJ\ Af'PE\L
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek affirmance of the .iL1dgment qf the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEi\lENT OF FACTS
I'L' illtirr~-l{v,;pondents disagree with the Statement of
l'ctcb .-;d f•)t·th in tlw br·icf of Defendants-Appellants and there follows
:1 cor11·ise statetllcnt of tlw material facts of this case.

Plaintiffs- Respondent.-; .t re the owners of an undeveloped
tr.1ct of pr·opt•r-t' 111 till' 1\lL Olympu.-; !lills No. 1 Subdivisioe1 in
l.ak< Cc)rirlt\.
~izc·,

howev<'t',

II\~.

11

:L)).

S:~lt

ThL• tract is ,.;lightly Jar·gcr than five acre" 111

tl•<' t1•11e lht• ofl'it ial 'oi!bdivisron plat was recorded,

tht· lot we!" in exct -." nftt·n a<TPS in ,;izt·.
In .1 ttrll ,)f 1 'J:i6, in th•·

COitl'.~l'

of developinJ.': the subdivision,

H. Hr·ockb.1nk, t·.tust·d tl11· offit·ial jJ!.,t of tlw \it. Olyrnpu,.; Hills No.

loC".ttron of tht•

1-lr·~e

t•·:1 u.:r·,. tr·act in tire

~uhdivi,.,ion.

l'rintcd in the

art•:l of such tr.tct on till· pl:.t ",.,. the nun••"·.tl "!"and tht• won]..,
".SJI(li'I'INI: Cl·:l\ITEH
ZClNJ•; C-1"

CCl~·J<\JI·:W::I,\1.

Th<· t•·n ·u'f'<' tr·.,ct, no<A ·qli>C<>.\IT!Ltt<·ly fivt• acres, is herein-

Br·ockh.tnk c.llh<·d to],,. pr.,paned tnd r<'cnnl .. d .t "l{e,.;tri<·li\·e Covenant" "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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documc·nt rdL•renccJ to the official plat previously recorded as the
1\lt. Olymptt,; Hills No. 1 Subdivision.

(R 15, 114).

The covenants

are largely designed to impose restrictions on the residential use of
the ,;everal hundred small lots contained on the plat and were by their
very language inapplicable to a lot the size, shape, location and
character of the large commercial lot.

Nevertheless, the all inclusive

language of the covenant could seemingly be construed to include the
commercial lot.
Pursuant to their plan to develop the commercial lot as
a shopping center, the Brockbanks made application to the county to zone
the commet·cial lot as Commercial Zone C-1 and such application was
approved by the county.

(R 116).

Later, the Brockbanks, upon threat

of condemnation, sold to the State Road Commission approximately five
acres of the then ten acre tract.

The Road Commission paid several

times what the property was worth as a residential property recognizing
it was intended and zoned for commercial use as a shopping center.
(R 116).

Some time thereafter, application was made to the county for

a conditional use permit to develop the lot for commercial purposes.
(R 116).

Title to the commercial lot was Stlbsequently transferred to
Loren and \• on Brockbank, the sons of Bernard P. and Nada R. Brockbank,
and still later, Von, along with his wife, Vickie, became the sole
owners
ofthethe
comnwrcial
lot and
are the
remaining
Sponsored by
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided
by the Institute Plaintiffs-Respondents
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in this ciCtion. (I{ 4).
In 1975, Plaintiffs-Respondents attempted to obtain financ:i ng
to develo;..> the commercial lot as a shopping center.

1t was at this time

that Plaintiffs-Respondents learned that lending institutions would not
finance the proposed development without a judicial determination as to
the inappiic.J.bility of the residential restrictions contained in the restrictive
coven::~nts

to the commercial lot.

Plaintiffs-Respondents then brought

this cL.l:-,s ·;ction ,;UJt joining as defendants, all property owners of the
lob

to

whos'' benef1t the covenants inured.
l'laintiff>i-Respomlents' Motion for Summary Judgment was

gr~lllled

on the grounds that the commercial lot is not restrictively limiteJ

by tlw covenant:; which bo~wd the other lots in the subdivision development

to which issue the District Court found there were no issue,; of fact raised
either by the pleadings, the Affidavits of Defendants-Appellants or of the
arguments of their counc;el which needed to be tried by a finder of fact.

A H.C:UMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL J(JlX;E WAS JUSTIFIED IN(; RANT!NC THE MOTION FOR
SUl\11\IA R\ .Tl'DCl\1ENT 1\S THERE EXISTED NO C ENUINE ISSUE OF
l\IATERIAL Fi1CT.

\ n expeditious disposition of cases is a c-.1rdinal virtue of
the admini~trc1tion
of justice,
as .Judge,
Justice,
said:
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
providedlater
by the Institute
of Museum Ce~rdozo
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The vc:rv object of a motion for summary judgment
is to separate what is formal or pretended in
denial or averment from what is genuine and sub,;tuntial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor
to the burden of a trial. Richard vs. Credit Swisse,
242 NY 346, 152 NE 110, 111 (1926).
This Court has long held that although a summary judgment must be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the losing party,
. . . the trial judge not only can but should grant a
motion for summary judgment if he feels certain
that he would rule that way no matter what proof a
party could produce in support of his contentions.
Allen's Products Company vs. Glover, et al., 18
utah 2d 9, 414 P. 2d 93, 94 (1966). (See also
Pioneer Savings and Loan Association vs. Pioneer
Finance and Thrift Company, 18 Utah 2d 106, 417
P. 2d 121 (1966).
In contesting the motion for summary judgment in the trial court, DefendantsAppellants relied upon the allegations of their answer (R 80) and three
affidavits, (R 219, 237, 239) none of which raised any material issues of
fact which necessitated a finding by a trier of fact.
In the case of Walker vs. Rocky l\ilountain Recreation Corp.
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P. 2d 538 (HJ73), which the Defendants-Appellants
cite in their brief, this Court held that the entry of summary judgment is
proper where the affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment
reveals no evidentiary facts, but merely sets forth the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions.

Further, the language the Defendants-

Appellants omitted from their quotation is highly relevant to the determin:ttio•l of this is,..ue.

(Defendants-Appellants' Brief page 14).

The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Tilr· clppo,;int.: .tfi'iLLl\it :-iLlbmitted by dcfenu.J.nt Liid
110t

comport with the r·t'quircmenb of Hulc 56(e),

ll. lt. C. P., i. c., such an :1ffidctvit must be made

on pcr,;on.ll knowledge of the affiant, and set forth
LLL ts that would be ddmissible in evidence :1nd sin w
th.J.t the• affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated thc::rein. Statements made merely on information and belief will hL' di,;regarded. Hearsay and
opinion testimony that would not be admis.~ible if
k,;tificd to .tt the trial may not prOfJerly be set
forth in an .tffid:J.Vit.

t<
·, .._r·

\ review of defendant's OfJfJOsing affid.J.vit reveals
no ,,, identi:t ry facts but merely rct1ects the

.•ffietnt's un,;ubstantiated opinions and conclusions in
rr·.f.'ard to the tr.tn,;ctctions. (lei. at 542).
The samL'

-;tatL·n~t·nl

Appelbnts.

l~ule

L·an hr• made as regards the affidavits of Defendants-

:J6(c). l•tc;h Ruh's of Civill'rocedure sbtl's, in pertinent

part:
Tlw judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the' pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-

tories, and J.dmissions on file, together with the
affidavits, 1f any, show that there is no genuine
i"sue as to ::tny material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgmm t as a matter of law.
Sub,;edion (e) of the s.lme Rule states, in pertinent part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
suppor·ted a" provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not n·st upon the mere allegations or·
denial,o of its pleading, but his re,.;ponse, by affidavit
or .ts otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facb, :ihowing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. li he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, sh::tll be entered J.gain,.;t him.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"v11·ttully ell I of tlw llll'llll>c:r.~ of tlw Cbs ..; had purchased their properi;y
in rc'liancc·

Ot:

tlw rc·~u·ictive covenc1nt" (R 84) Defendants-Appellants

were 01hle to ol>te1in from the over 300 class members, only two affidavits,
one Ly tht•H' c·ounsel.

ln his Affidavit, DefemLl.nt Don Smith states:

That he knew of the restrictive covenant covered
by Lot 1 and relied thereon in his purchase of
tlw property. (R 237)

A cardul cx.uninatio:t of this statement will reveal that the Affiant is not
stating a

matc~r1al is~uc

of fact, but rather c1n

unsub~tant1atcd

conclusion,

which would be an in<Jdmissible opinion that the covenant was applicable to
Lot 1, inasmuch as that is the basis of this class action suit.

Under the

Walker case, supra, this would be insufficient to oppose a motion for
summary judgment.

Smith does not say that he believed that the restrictive

covenant applied to Lot 1 or that he relied on any such belief in purchasing
his property.

He is merely stating that he relied on a covenant which he

described as "covered by Lot 1" (perhaps he meant covering Lot 1).

Mr.

Spafford's Affidavit, m addition to being merely the self-serving attempt
by cour.sel to bolster his defense, and if given at trial would have likely
been disbelieved by the finder of fact (See Howick vs. Bank of Salt Lake,
28 (ltah 2cl 64, 498 P. 2d 352 (1972)), suffers the same deficiencies present
in 1\1 r •.Snnth 1 ,.; Affidavit described above.

Mr. Spafford merely states

that at th<' time he purchased some of the property in question "Affiant
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
provided by the
Museum and Library
Services
wac;
mformcd
of and
relied
upon
t11e langu:1ge
ofInstitute
said ofrestrictive
covenant".
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This llllStJbc;t;,ntiateu conclusion

2201.

(I{

(Walker,~~)

does not

cv<'ll llll'llt\On the possibility of the application to Lot 1 of the restrictive
c·m·,.,,~u1b

respecting residential use.
:\t·cording to West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. § 437 c:
•\ n affidavit opposing motion for summary judgment
does not raise triable fact issue, unless it states
Ltcts showing thclt [the] rnrty has a good and sub,bntial defense or that a good cause of action exists
on merits.
It is no wonucr that nc•ither Smith nor Spafford came right out

and llleeeLI til tt they believed the residential use covenants applied to the
<'011\lllt'l'Cul Int.

In or:J,•r tn havc· the slightest notio'> that the restric·iv?

l'OITiianLi might hctve applieu to the large ten, later five,

acr~

tract of

l!nne' Plop,•cl Ltnd, one would have to look at the plat referr·ed to if'

t)1

,.,._t,·ictilc ,·overLtnb documL·nt SlrH r· tht: plat was the only reference
,JJ,•winl! wJ,idJ property

t-:,

\'It

~1

1

tll':-JUr\

'Dlllm<·L···'·'' lot
t<"l

:tL'I'L'

tlLlll

thl'

wa.~ argu~d>ly

cx,tmin:ltion
wOJ.:;

of

t}H· plat quickly discloses the fact that the

rL'"''rvr•d for development as a shopping center.

lot. :tpfwaring on th<· plat to
J'l'.~i<lcnti~L!

coverecllJy tht· restrictive covt'n:tntc,

Jut-., wa,:

cl<·~u·ly

1.,,.

some Hurty or forty tl!nes

Tht·

brgc~·

.tnd boldly iclent1fied ill capita'

enn"1''by the
n:~;tl
lot. LawItLibrary.
i· :m;J<,rt:
tr 'JOt<·
that
Smith
nor· Sp::tlonl
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Funding for nt
digitization
provided
by thenl'tthcr
Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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allege:

1.

The1t he read the residential use restrictions, or

2.

That he believed that the residential use restrictions

ap;Jlied to the ten acre commercial lot, or
3.

That he relied on SllCh a belief in pllrchasing his

property.
Instead, they have made a bare assumption or conclusion
not sLipported by the undisputed facts.

Even if Mr. Smith or Mr. Spafford

h<1d asserted in their Affidavits that they had relied on the fact that the
residential use restrictions applied to the large undeveloped tract and

the trial court found such reliance, under the undisputed facts set forth
above, the cout·t was well within its discretion to rule as a matter of law
that such reliance was not :oufficient to estop Plaintiffs-Respondents from
asserting that the residential use restrictions were never intended to
apply to the commercial lot.
Under Utah law, the party alleging estoppel must establish:
1.

That his reliance was reasonable and that in so relying

he u;;ed rcasoCJable prudence and diligence.

(Morgan vs. Board of State

Land;;) 549 P. 2d 695, 697 (Utah, 1976), Baggs vs. Anderson, 528 P. 2d
141, 143 (Utah, 1974), and J. P. Koch, Inc. vs. J. C. Penney Company,
lnc., 534 P. :2d 903, 905 (Utah, 1975);
:2.

That he substantially changed his position to his detriment

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
, 1 ~ a r,·sult of Library
o-;uc:hServices
rPliance,
Baggs, supra, at page 143 and J. P. Koch,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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,;upr,;, :tt

p.tl'L'

!J05; :ll1d

:;.

That he would not have so changed hi,; position except

for the co'lduct of the other 1Jat'ty.

(Kelly vs. Richards, 83 P. 2d 731,

734 (l'tah, 1 !138)).
With respect to the last two requirements neither Mr. Smith
nor 1\lr. Spafford has stated in his Affidavit that he suffered any detriment or that he would not have bought his property but for his reliance.
\\ ith r·espect to the fir,;t requirement of reasonable reliance,
not onlv havp 1\lr. :-;mtth and Mr. Spafford failed to a,;sert reasonable
reliam·e, but e'en it th,•y had, the tr·i,t! court was well within its discretion
to rule that based upon the undisputed fact;.;, such reliance, if any, was
um·easonaLle as a mattpr of law.

As indicated ahove, neither Mr. Smith

nor lV1 r. Spafford could have had any inkling that the residential use
restriction might have applied to the large undeveloped tract of land
without first examining the recorded plat which plainly sets forth that
the tract was reserved for commercial use as a shopping center.

As such,

i'vlr. Smith's and Mr. Spafford's reliance on the assumption that the
residential use restrictions applied to Lot 1 would be patently unreasonal,lc>.

Even if Mr. Smith and Mr. Spafford had not examined the recorded

plat, (in which case they CO'.lld not have had any idea th;;t the restrictive
covenant,; might have even arguably included the commPr'cial lot) their
relidnce, if any, woulcl still have been unreasonable, for as the Utah
Supreme Court stated

0'1

page 697 of the 1\lorgan case in Footnote 4:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not operate
in favor of one who has knowledge of the essential
facts or one who has convenient and available means
of obtaining such knowledge.
Assummg arguendo, the alleged facts raised by the affidavits
were established, they would not have precluded summary judgment,
since they do not go to the basis of the Motion, that being the interpretatior1 of the restrictive covenant to the large commercial lot.
Court said in the case of Rich vs. McGovern,

As this

on the question of review

of a s umrna ry judgment:
. . • [I]nasmuch as the party moved against is being
defeated without the privilege of a trial, the court
should carefully scrutinize the 'submissions' and
contentions he makes thereon to see if his contentions
and proposals as to proof of material facts, if
resolved in his favor, would entitle him to prevail
551 P. 2d 1266, 1268 (Utah, 1976),
At most, the resolution of the issue of reliance in favor of the
Defendants-Appellants would have given rise to a suit for monetary damages,
not dismissal of the motion for summary judgment on the interpretation of
the covenants' applicability.

It is no wonder Defendants-Appellants did

not rely on thP element of damages since despite the unreasonableness
of any alleged reliance, the homeowners in the class most affected have
ctlready received the benefit of the large lot being reserved for commercial
use.

It is undisputt>d that those lots facing the commercial lot were sold

tor onr>-half price.

As such, any effort on the part of those homeowner
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comnwrct,d Jot for· the pur-po'<e for· which it was intended would result
in an unju,.;t cnr·iclnncnt to

th,~m.

It is clectr that neither the answer nor the Affidavits filed by
DefendJ.nts-Appellants raise any material is:;ues of fact and a;; ;;uch, the
trial court was amply within its discretion

to grant the motion for

summary judgment.

POINT T1
WHERE THE !JOC\TJ\IENT TO BE CONSTRUED WAS CLEARLY AMBICUOllS, THE TRlAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING THE INTENT
OF THE SPBDT\ ISION DEVELOPER.
It is unctcs.tiLlble that the language of the restrictive covenants

explicitly rders to, and unquestionably incorporates, the subdivision plat.
Indeed, the :;ubdivision plat is critical in order to identify the pro;:>erty to
which the restrictive covenants apply.

The covenant describes the

restricted property as:
All of Mt. Olympus Hills No. 1 and No. 3,according
to the official plat thereof on file in the office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County. (R 15).
A r'":;trictive covenant is a contract.
Restrictive Covenants).

(37A Words and

Phr;_~sb,

It is well settled that:

• . . it b the general rule that where a contract
r·cfers to, and incorporates the provisions of another
instrument they shall be construed together. 17A
C".T .S. Contrctcts § 299.
This Court in Bullfrog J\•larin:.t, Inc, vs. Lentz,

28 Utah 2d 261, 501 1'. Zd
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~66

(19721 hdd that:
. . . where two or more instruments are executed
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at
different times in the course of the same transaction,
and concern the same subject matter, they will be
read and construed together so far as determining
the respective rights and interests of the parties
(!d. at 271 ). (See also 4 Williston on Contracts,
3rd Ed,)§ 628 p. 904).

Reference to the official subdivision plat shows the large ten acre (now
five acre) commercial lot clearly identified as "SHOPPING CENTER
CO!VIl\1 EH.CIA L ZONE C -1 ".

The restricti vc: covenants seem to indicate

tlut all lob arc to be used for r·c;-;idential
lob for schools and churches.

pu~po.'ies

with the exception of two

As such, it is apparent that the intent of

the develo;wr cannot be ascertained from the four corners of the document
itself.

In the c:ctse of such an ambiguity, the court was justified in con-

sider'ing extrinsic £>vidence to establish the intent of the subdivision

In" similar situation where this Court was addressing itself
to the proper CO'lstruction of a real estate covenant it said:
In view of the absence of a clear and definite
exprc,.;sion in the contracts, it was proper for
the trial court to take extraneous evidence and
to look to the total circumstance;; to ascertain tl,e
intent. First Western Fidelity vs. Gibbons & Reed
Company, 27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P. 2d 132, 134 (1971).
1t is well settled that:

The fundamental rule in construing restrictiv'~ covenants
1s that the intention of the parties as shown by the
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cov c·runt goverii~ • . . In the determin;~tion of the
int<·rttion or the 1urtic·s, the entirl' context or the
cov<·n,tnl i,; to 1.Je considered. [20 Am. Jur. 2d,
Coven~nts,

Co:-~ditiOns ~nd Re,.;tt·ictio~1s,

~186

p.

75:l].
l'ur·ther, this Court has

st~ted

w1th respect to the interpre-

tation of restrictive covenants:
The intentions of the parties, as g~thered from the surrounding circumstances, ~nd purpose of the restriction,
n111st be considered ~nd given effect. Metropolitan
Investment Company vs. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P. 2d
!1-10, 045 (1>162).
Pl~intiffs-Respondenb

evidence is

do not dispute the proposition that extrinsic

inc~clmissiblc·

however·, this cl e.1 rh

,,~

to vary tlw terms of an unambiguous document,
110t controlling in thP instant case.

It is true that the express term;; of an agreement may not
be abrogated, nullified or mo::lified by parol testimony;
but where, because of vaguenes,; or uncertainty in the
language used, the intent of the parties is in question, the
co:.~rt may consider the situation of the parties, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the making of the contract,
the purpose of its execution and the respective claims
thereunder, to ascertain what the parties intended.
Continental Bark & Trust Company vs. Stewart, 4 Utah
2cl 228, 291 p. 2d 890, 892 (1955 ).

The blatant cont1ict between the language of the restrictive covenants and
the official plat incorporated therein makes the intent of the parties unasccr·tainablc without reference to extrinsic evidence.

Defendants-Appellant

reliance on the cases of Commercial Building Corporatioet vs. Blair, 565
P. 2d 776, ((Jt. 1977); Clyde v;;, Eddington Canning Co.,

10 lltah 2d 1-1,

347 P. 2d 563 (1959); and Pubipher vs. Tolboe, 13 Utah 2d 190, 370 P. 2d
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360 (1962), is as ;;uch unfounded.

In each case, this Court dealt with

documents in which the language was clear and unambiguous on its face,
and in which reference was not required to a second document in order
to determine the intent of the original document.

Such is clearly not the

case with regard to the restrictive covenants in the instant case.

As such,

the lower court did not commit reversible error in considering the intent
of the subdivision developer who caused the restrictive covenants to be
drafted.

POINT III
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS CLEARLY WERE NOT INTENDED TO
APPLY TO THE COMMERCIAL LOT, AND THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED
lN SO CONCLUDING.
When the restrictive covenants document and the recorded
plat are read together, the undisputed facts established clearly show
that the express intent of the original subdividers and grantors was that
the restrictive covenants regarding residential use did not apply to the
then ten acre tract, which was being reserved for commercial use as a
shO;:Jping center.

The undisputed material facts established by Plaintiffs-

Respondents' Affidavits are as follows:
(1)

The restrictive covenant document explicitly refers to

and incorporates the plat which clearly identifies the commercial lot as
"SHOPPINC CENTER COMMERCIAL ZONE C-1" on the face of the plat.
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(~)

eommt•t·,·i~tl

lot

It

w~,,;

wa.~

nc,er the intention of the grantors that the

to l,e :,;ubject to the restrictive covenants. (R 114,

~09).

(:l)

At the time the plat was recorded, there was no sho:Jping

center· dnywlwrc near the area.
(.!)

(R 115, 209).

Prospective buyers asked which areas had been desig-

nc<ted for ,.,cho:Jls and for shopping, and nearly all prospective buyers would
not buv a

r.c~idential

,.,hopping ccnkr."
(51

the large tr.1ct a,;

uuilding lot unless they knew where the scho::Jls aml

'"'-'~'''going

to be located.

(!{ 115, 209).

I' cospc•cti ve buyers were shown the plat which identified
'sllOPf'lNC CENTER COMMERCIAL ZONE C-1" and

c•ach customer· was shown the location of various lots on the plat.

(R 115,

~00).

(6)

Residential lots facing the ten acre tract

includin~

those

on Westview Drive, were sold at one-half price of the other lots in the
c;rrbdivision hcc',lUc;e they were facing the shopping center area, and
pttrchasc es of thos c lot:-o were informed before their purchases that their
lob wl're l'acing tlw proposed shopping center property which would be
ust•d tor commerci:\1 pueposcs.
(7)

(R 115, 209).

s~llt Lake County zoned the ten acre tract as commercial

ZonL' C-1 upon tlw application of Bernard P. Brockbank, one of the
oeiginal ,.,ubdividers J.nd geantors.

(R 116, 209).
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(8)

Approximately five acres of the ten acre tract were

sold to the state for road changes at a price several times what the five
acres were worth as residential property, based on the value of the
property for shopping center purposes because the ten acres had been
reserved for commercial zoning and development as a shopping center.
(R 116, 209).

(9)

The Plaintiffs-Respondents are paying a commercial

tax rate on Lot 1 even though it is not being used on a commercial basis
and Plaintiffs-Respondents are incurring substantial loss for delay in such
use.

(R 103, 210).
None of these material facts have been disputed.
That the restrictive covenants document with respect to

residential use was never intended to apply to the commercial lot is
further evidenced by the fact that many of the.se restrictive coven'l.nts
obviously could not apply to the large tract.

For example, it would be

economically unfeasible and patently unreasonable to

~xpect

that only one

detached single-family dwelling not to exceed one and one-half stories in
height could be built on a ten acre lot some thirty to forty times larger
than all other surrounding lots, pursuant to Item 1 of the restrictive
covenants.

Furthermore, the side yard lines and interior lot lines

mentioned in Item 4 of the restrictive covenants do not exist on the ten
ae re (now five acre) tract.

Finally, the rPstriction :tga i nst 0nc ro1chment
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111 Jt,·tll

~

c.tnnul :tppl) to the commercial lot because it is not ctdjacent

to _tny oth,·r lob.
Plaintiffs -l{espondents do not con tend that the zoning of the
pn.Jiwrty ,.;upcL-;cdcs the language of the restrictive covenanb, however,
tl11~

Ltct lhctt tl1l' subdivision developer, within two years of the record.J.tion

ot tilL' ,.;ubuJ\·i;-;io:1 pbt, mauc appliccttion to have the property
,,Jllllllct·,· i:ll

pur·po.~es

zoC~ed

for

cl<•.J.t'h shows that the intent of the developer was

tlul llw rc;-;tt·idlv•· ·. u\ <·rLulb were in:J.pplic::tble to the large commercial
lot.
It i> tiJ, , , :on; obviou:o :.11lll the District Court was justified in
fincliJ1g, th:J.t thL· J'''"id,·nti:J.I

n:strictio::~c;

were never intended to 'J.pply to

the L'Ommerc:i:tl lot.

!'OINT IV

TilE TR11\L COIJI{T'S IU:FiiSAL TO CONSJDEH DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS' DEI,.ENSE OF' STATUTE OF Lli\!ITATIONS IS NOT
JU·:VJ<;RSlBLE EHI{OR WHERE THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE
NOT SEEK!NC HEFOR~IAT!ON OF THE DOCUMENTS IN THEIH 1\JOT!O~
I<'OH Slil\11\li\ R\ JlJDC:J\IEWC
l'bintiff.c-H<·spond(•nts' Firo,t C:J.uc,c• of Actiol1 in their Compl:un
(1\

~-fil l'<'<Jilt··:tt·d

t Judi•·i:tl detr:rmination of the applicability of the

r·estr·i,·tj,,. UJ'vc·tnnt.s to t!H· l:trg" commercictl lot, by con-.:truing the
rt·."tr·Jr:liv<· t·Ov<·n tnt,; documt·nt together w1th thf: recorded pl:tt incorporJtec

onh by111the tht·
lltpr·rntive,
:t n·fot'mation
of bythe
n•:,trictl'''-'
co,·<·nctnb
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to c·onfonn with thL: ollv1ous intent of the ueveloper.

1\s such, the only

issue in tlw motion for summary juugmcnt was whether, as a matter
of law, the

rc~trictive

covenants document applies to the large ten acre

(no.v five ctcre) commercial lot when the restrictive covenants document
and the recorued plat are read together, irrespective of any mistake or
reformation.

It wa:; well within the prerogatives of the District Court

to grclnt Plain tiffs- Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment without
considering Defenuants-Appellants' defense of statute of limitations where
.such defen:;e is clearly irrelevant, immaterial and inapplicable to the
court's dctermine1tion of the non-applicability of the restrictive covenants
to the co:nmercial lot.
The mere fact that Plaintiffs- Respondents originally alleged
that the designe1tion of the large commercial lot as No. 1 was done by
mistake and/or inadvertence is not controlling inasmuch as the statute of
limitatio:-~s

(Utah Code Annotated, 78-12-26(3)) is only applicable where

relief is sought on the ground of mistake.

In an instant case, Plaintiffs-

Hespondents sought, and the court granted, the summary judgment on the
basis that the restrictive covenants are inapplicable to the large five acre
tract and were never intended to be so.

(R 241, 242).

As such, Defendants-

Appellant:;' defenc;e of the statute of limitations is clearly without merit
and the trial court was justified in so finding.
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-:wCONCLUSION
Wlwrc there wa"' no genuine issue of any n1aterial fact
raised in oppoc.ition th-.1t was relevant ormatcrial to the dispo:-,ition
of the motion fur summary judgment, the trial jucg e was justified in
averting the substantial damage and delay caused by the burden of an
unnecessary trial.
The: record clearly establishes that the language of the
restr·icti\ ,.

CO\

cnants documc>nt with the plat incorporated therein is

ambiguoas tlw intent of which is unascertainable without reference to
extrinsic evidence.

The trial court was well within its discretion in

considering cxtnnsic evidence of the intent of the subdivision developer.
In examination of the evidence before the trial judge on the
motion for

~ummary

judgment, the decision that the restrictive covenants

document does not apply to the large commercial lot did not constitute
reversible error.
Defendants -Appellants' defense of the statute of limitations
was without merit to the motion for summary judgment inasmuch as
interpretation of the restrictive covenants precluded the necessity of
reformmg thP document.
THEREFORE, the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.
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